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vABSTRACT
Mobile Adhoc Network (MANET) is vulnerable to network attacks due to
its open communication medium. Blackhole and wormhole attacks are the most
severe attacks in the network. The attacks cause congestion and increase the
possibility of confidential data theft. Unfortunately, the existing security solutions
are insufficient to protect the network. This work proposed a new security
framework, named Extra Secure Adhoc on Demand Distance Vector (ESAODV).
This framework provides a defense-in-depth protection through layered security
measures: secure protocol and intrusion detection system (IDS) with extra
countermeasures. The first layer implements lightweight packet authentication,
and the second layer monitors and counters malicious packets. In this study,
ESAODV was implemented using Java in Time Simulator/Scalable Wireless
Adhoc Network Simulator, and analyzed using R-Statistics, Sigma Plot and
Minitab. Results showed that ESAODV had contained the blackhole attack
and the hybrid blackhole attack (HBHA) effectively. The number of corrupting
routing tables of benign nodes could be minimized to be near zero even if the
number of attackers were increased. In addition, the IDS accurately detected
the wormhole and the variant of wormhole attack called diversion of packet over
the wormhole link (DP-WHL). The false positive for live attack detection was
small. The accuracy of detection was more than 94.5 percent. Although attackers
changed the pattern of packets diversion, the IDS detected the new attack pattern
in near real time. In addition to these findings, this research has also modeled
four performance metrics data of ESAODV, i.e., memory usage, elapsed time
for completing routing tasks, number of route replies and route success, based
on both linear regression and neural network. Goodness of fit parameters for
the models based on the neural network was higher than the linear regression.
ESAODV has been proven to provide a comprehensive protection from the most
severe attacks in the network. Furthermore, the performance metrics of ESAODV
based on the neural network produced a superior model.
.
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ABSTRAK
Rangkaian mudah alih adhoc (MANET) terdedah kepada serangan
rangkaian kerana medium komunikasinya terbuka. Serangan blackhole dan
wormhole adalah serangan yang paling bahaya dalam rangkaian MANET.
Serangan ini menyebabkan kesesakan dalam rangkaian dan meningkatkan
kemungkinan kecurian data sulit. Malangnya, penyelesaian keselamatan yang
sedia ada tidak mencukupi untuk melindungi rangkaian tersebut. Kerja ini
mencadangkan satu rangka kerja baru yang dinamakan sebagai Extra Secure
Adhoc on Demand Distance Vector (ESAODV ). Rangka kerja ini memberikan
perlindungan pertahanan secara mendalam melalui langkah-langkah keselamatan
berlapis: protokol keselamatan dan sistem pengesanan pencerobohan (IDS)
dengan langkah balas tambahan. Lapisan pertama melaksanakan pengesahan
paket yang ringan, dan lapisan kedua memantau dan membalas paket
jahat. Dalam kajian ini, ESAODV telah diterapkan menggunakan simulator
JiST/SWANS dan dianalisis menggunakan R-Statistics, Sigma Plot dan perisian
Minitab. Keputusan menunjukkan, ESAODV boleh membendung serangan
blackhole dan hybrid blackhole attack (HBHA) dengan berkesan. Kerosakan
kandungan jadual penghalaan pada nod benigna dikurangkan kepada hampir
sifar walaupun bilangan penyerang meningkat. Selain daripada itu, IDS boleh
mengesan dengan tepat wormhole dan variasi serangan wormhole yang dikenali
sebagai DP-WHL. Pengesanan positif palsu untuk serangan ini adalah kecil.
Ketepatan pengesanan adalah tinggi iaitu melebihi 94.5 peratus. Walaupun
penyerang mengubah corak pengalihan paket, IDS mengesan corak serangan
tersebut kepada masa nyata. Selain daripada itu, kajian ini juga telah
memodelkan empat data metrik prestasi ESAODV seperti penggunaan memori,
masa yang diambil untuk menyelesaikan tugasan penghalaan, bilangan jawapan
halaan dan halaan yang berjaya berdasarkan regresi linear dan rangkaian
neural. Parameter ketepatan padanan bagi model berdasarkan rangkaian
neural adalah lebih tinggi daripada regresi linear. ESAODV telah terbukti
menyediakan perlindungan komprehensif daripada serangan yang paling bahaya
dalam rangkaian ini. Tambahan lagi, metrik prestasi ESAODV berdasarkan
rangkaian neural menghasilkan satu model yang unggul.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview
In recent years, Mobile Adhoc Network (MANET) has been rapidly
developed and has been used in many applications, ranging from military to
civilian and commercial. The setting up of such network can be performed
without either any human intervention or existence of infrastructure. Search
and rescue missions, data collection, and virtual classrooms and conferences,
are examples of applications for the network. Devices such as laptops, Personal
Digital Assistants (PDAs), and smartphones are some of the MANET nodes that
use wireless media in order to communicate among themselves.
MANET is more vulnerable than wired network because of its open
medium. Figure 1.1 shows the susceptibility of benign nodes to attack conducted
by attackers. In that figure, attackers can threaten and attack the benign nodes
at any time from any node. Mobility, unavailability of a central administration in
this network, and auto organizing capability among the nodes contribute to the
network security holes. Moreover, the unique characteristics and constraints of
the mobile nodes, which are incapable of generating their own power and limited
power supply, also contribute to the network security risks.
The intrinsic vulnerabilities of mobile adhoc network lies within the
wireless links, its routing protocols, and the auto-configuration mechanisms as
detailed below.
a. Wireless links
Wireless links make MANET susceptible to attack. It is easier for hackers
to eavesdrop and gain access into the adhoc network for stealing the
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Figure 1.1: MANET Susceptibility
confidential information. It is also easier for them to enter or leave the
network because no physical connection is required. The attackers can also
attack nodes for deleting messages, injecting false packets, or impersonating
identities (Bellardo and Savage, 2003; Bicakci and Tavli, 2009). The final
goal of the attack is to disrupt network service and to violate the network’s
goals, i.e., availability, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation.
b. Routing protocols and end-to-end packets forwarding.
The routing protocols in MANET suffer from many attacks since their
designs normally consider a trusted and collaborated environment (Yang
et al., 2004; Djenouri et al., 2005). Their designs assume unavailability
of attacks. However, in real scenario, attacks in the network are easily
generated, and the types of attacks are many. For example, blackhole
attack, by sending false routing information, implies bogus route entries in
nodes routing tables. As a result, many incorrect routings exist, and cause
bottleneck to the communication channels. In another case, an attacker can
deceive security process by controlling traffic ‘to’ and ‘from’ entire parts of
the network. In a worst case scenario, the malicious nodes can drop or
modify the packets that travel through them.
3c. Auto configuration.
As indicated by Buiati et al. (2004), and Wang et al. (2005), the auto-
configuration brings up new functional vulnerabilities to false replies
regardless of the protocols used. In this case, an attacker can utilize
the information from the neighbors to deny a new host from joining the
network. First, the attacker may verify all occupied addresses, thus claims
the unoccupied addresses are in use. As a result a new host cannot join the
network.
1.2 Research Motivations
The vulnerabilities of wireless link and auto configuration are native
features of MANET that cannot be removed. However, the vulnerability of
routing protocol can be managed or eliminated through security patches or
security updates. Moreover, Caballero (2006) has proven that routing protocol is
the most vulnerable point in the mobile adhoc network. As such many attacks
are easily generated to cripple MANET operations.
Many works have been proposed to address the vulnerability of MANET
through secure routing and packet forwarding. However, most of them only
provide single security layer approach, i.e., either cryptographic authentication
or intrusion detection system. In addition, their results have been also conducted
without considering the extensive data analysis. Le Boudec (2010) stated that
insufficient data analysis produces misinformative and incomprehensive results.
These problems motivate this research to explore and to provide better
solutions than existing, which include both security solutions and performance
analyses. Thus, the security solutions will deal with development of layered
security concept as a framework for securing MANET routing. The framework
consist of two security layers, i.e., a secure protocol in first layer, and intrusion
detection with countermeasures in second layer. This concept resembles and
adapts the security concept in the wired network, which is well known as a defense-
in-depth architecture (Santos, 2007). Furthermore, the performance analyses
present the models of the network performance measures that can also be applied
as a general network performance measure.
41.3 Background of the Problem
This section presents a discussion on the limitations of exiting MANET
routing protocols and the weakness of the proposed securities solutions. Last
but not least, it discusses the limitation of performance analysis on the existing
proposed security for MANET.
1.3.1 Limitations of MANET Routing Protocols
The early studies on MANET were focused on some fundamental problems
of MANET routing protocols. The design of efficient routing protocols and
new mobility models received many attentions from researchers. During the
development, most researchers assumed that the protocols run in a trusted
environment (Yang et al., 2004; Djenouri et al., 2005).
Routing protocol are normally categorized into three gorups. They are
proactive, reactive, and hybrid routing protocols (Changling Liu, 2003; Abusalah
et al., 2008; Arora et al., 2010). Djenouri et al. (2005) stated that the reactive
protocols are more adaptable to MANET environment than the proactive. Bai
and Singhal (2006) showed the reactive outperforms the proactive in terms of the
packet delivery ratio, overhead and energy efficiency. Meanwhile, Junhai et al.
(2009) concluded that the reactive is more scalable than the proactive routing
protocol, although their source nodes might suffer from long delays of route
searching. The hybrid adopts both features of proactive and reactive techniques
in determining efficient routes. However, the hybrid routing protocol receives
little attentions from MANET community since it needs more resources, such as
computation and memory.
Several popular reactive routing protocols are Adhoc on Demand Vector
(AODV) (Perkins and Royer, 1999; Perkins et al., 2003) and Dynamic Source
Routing (DSR)(Johnson, 1996; Johnson et al., 2007). The protocols perform
better operation than Destination Sequence Distance Vector (DSDV)(Perkins and
Bhagwat, 1994) and Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA)(Park and
Corson, 2001) in several situations such as high density, high mobility, and high
traffic (Feeney, 1999). All of these protocols do not consider any security measure
(Djenouri et al., 2005).
5AODV suffers from falsification of both destination sequence number
(DSN) and hop count fields (Djenouri et al., 2005). This protocol is also
susceptible to tunneling, spoofing, falsifying a route error and rushing attacks.
Jiejun Kong (2003) showed that AODV is more vulnerable than anonymous on-
demand routing protocol (ANODR). Weerasinghe and Fu (2008) demonstrated
that AODV greatly suffers from cooperative blackhole attack. Through
simulation, Arora et al. (2010), concluded that the AODV is also vulnerable
to wormhole attack compared to DSR.
1.3.2 Limitations of the Existing Security Frameworks against the
Attacks
Zhang and Lee (2005), and Wu et al. (2007) differentiated attacks in
MANET routing into simple and sophisticated attacks. Based on the simplicity in
triggering the attacks, blackhole attack (Deng et al., 2002; Sun et al., 2003a) is the
most dangerous attack in the type of simple attacks. Meanwhile, wormhole attack
(Hu et al., 2003a, 2006) is the most severe attack in the type of sophisticated
attacks. Therefore, many efforts have been devoted to address both types of
attacks. In general, the defense from those attacks can be categorized into
preventive and reactive techniques (Wu et al., 2007; Lima et al., 2009).
The preventive technique adopts cryptography as the basis of defense to
those attacks. The technique often employs symmetric key, digital public key and
digital certificate for authenticating and for maintaining the integrity of routing
packets. Some researchers, e.g. Smith et al. (1997); Jacobs and Corson (1999);
Binkley and Trost (2001); Zapata and Asokan (2002); Sanzgiri et al. (2002, 2005);
Papadimitratos and Haas (2002), and Hu and Perrig (2005), use the technique
in their works. Unfortunately, these works are conducted without considering
extensive test based on attacks. Therefore, the strength of the cryptography to
the attacks cannot be demonstrated.
To overcome the limitations on the security testing, several researchers
consider a well-known attack, blackhole attack, in their proposed security.
Ramaswami and Upadhyaya (2006) implemented this attack for evaluating a
modified Secure AdHoc on-Demand Vector (SAODV). They also introduced ACK
packet that is modified from a route reply (RREP) packet. However, ACK
6packet has a different of routing path compared to the RREP. The goal of the
modification is to improve the security strength of SAODV. Unfortunately, this
modification decreases the number of delivered packets and degrades the network
performance compared to the original SAODV.
Other researchers, Lu et al. (2009), proposed Secure AODV (SAODV). It
should be noted that the name of their proposed scheme is similar to Zapata and
Asokan’s scheme but no correlation between the twos schemes. The authors also
implement blackhole attack in evaluating the proposed security. This attack is
generated by a node that has been setup as attacker or Bad Adhoc On-demand
Distance Vector (BAODV). Thus, based on testing results, the authors developed
a mechanism for defending MANET routing from this attack. Unfortunately, the
results show that the SAODV (Lu et al., 2009) consumes extra memory and CPU
resources.
All proposed secure protocols as described so far also suffer from
factorization attack (crypto attack). The digital signatures or certificates, used
by the secure protocols, are tractable in the quantum computer. Shor (1997) has
proven that factoring the digital signatures are simple. Moreover, Roblot (2004);
ChA˜l´ze and Galligo (2006); Wallace and White (2008) and Zhai (2009) strengthen
Shor’s results.
The reactive technique keeps track or monitors to their neighbor activities
for determining whether suspicious activities occur. The technique is well known
as intrusion detection. In real world, the technique is realized as an intrusion
detection system (IDS). There are three groups of IDS based on the mechanism
of detection (Mishra et al., 2004). They are signature based IDS, anomaly
based IDS, and specification based IDS (a hybrid both signature and anomaly
based IDS). The signature based IDS compares incoming packets with pre-known
attacks (or signature of attack). The anomaly based IDS attempts to detect
activities that differ from the normal expected system behavior. Meanwhile,
the specification based IDS performs monitoring on operation of a system using
security specification (security rule).
Several IDSes have been directed to detect simple attacks in MANET.
Kurosawa et al. (2007); Cheng et al. (2008); Fourati et al. (2008); Roy et al. (2010),
and Su (2011) proposed IDS for detecting blackhole attack. Bononi and Tacconi
(2007) use a combination of ‘intrusion detection and cryptography’ for detecting
7several attacks (blackhole, route disruption, and DOS attacks). Meanwhile, Lauf
et al. (2010) proposed IDS for identifying spoofing attacks in MANET. These
IDSes consider the anomaly detection. In fact, anomaly detection needs large
memory, requires much CPU resources and slow in detecting attacks. Indeed,
since the goal of these IDSes is to detect simple attacks, they are incapable of
identifying sophisticated attacks such as the wormhole attack.
Some researchers, such as Hu et al. (2003a, 2006), Poovendran and
Lazos (2007), Qian et al. (2007), Vu et al. (2008), Nait-Abdesselam (2008),
and Su (2010) proposed mechanisms to defend MANET from wormhole attack.
However, Hu et al. (2003a, 2006) technique needs extra hardware, i.e., Global
Positioning System (GPS)-disciplined clock for time synchronization. Poovendran
and Lazos’s technique incurs huge computation resources since they adopt graph
theory in detecting the wormhole attack. Intrusion detection based on statistical
analysis of multi-path (SAM) (Qian et al., 2007) considers anomaly as the
mechanism of detection. As such SAM is slow in detecting wormhole attack
and needs huge data for learning a normal behavior. A security solution for the
wormhole by Nait-Abdesselam (2008) is inaccurate to detect wormhole attack in a
high density of adhoc network. Moreover, Wormhole Avoidance Routing Protocol
(WARP) (Su, 2010) suffers in performance because it removes the capability of
answering route request packets in the middle nodes even though the nodes have
the requested route.
Figure 1.2 summarizes the security problems and the existing works to
secure the network. Referring to the figure, routing protocols of the network
suffer from spoofing, blackhole, and wormhole attacks. The attacks disrupt
MANET’s routing, determine inaccurate interpretation of the network topology,
and contribute to the abnormality of packet’s delivery. In the worst case,
the attacks cause congestion within the network and increase the possibility of
confidential data theft. In short, most of the existing protections for MANET
are insufficient to defend the network from both simple and sophisticated attacks.
They have a limitation to the effect of prevention techniques in general since most
of them consider only single security layer in the network. It is incomprehensive
in term of security mechanism since attackers can directly strike to the target
after they succeeded in breaking the single security layer.
In addition to the limitation of the existing works for securing MANET is
the performance due to security implementation. Most of the existing protections
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Figure 1.2: Illustration of the problems background
need much resources, e.g., memory and CPU, and slow in detecting both types of
attacks. It is contradictory to the natures of mobile adhoc network, which have
limited power supply, memory and CPU resources. Furthermore, the existing
protections based on authentication also suffer from factorization attacks, and
some of the proposed defenses from wormhole attack require extra hardware.
1.3.3 Limitations of Performance Analysis on the Existing Proposed
Security for MANET
There are two ways in performing performance analysis in MANET, i.e.,
‘analytical of performance based on purely mathematical science’ and ‘simulation
of performance based on discrete event simulation (DES)’ (see Bolch et al. (2006)
for details). Analytical approach observes and uses many assumptions on the
network parameters and the network variables in achieving tractable network
models (Hanbali et al., 2008). Through the models, this approach describes
the network performance as reported by Groenevelt et al. (2005), Zhang et al.
(2007), and Hanbali et al. (2008). In contrast, the simulation based on DES
9relies on a simulator software to demonstrate the network performance, such as
in Gnana Durai and Parthasarathy (2005); Razak et al. (2008), and Komninos
and Douligeris (2009).
The network parameters and variables increase proportionally with the
complexity of the network. Simplifying the parameters and variables can reduce
the reliability of the network models. Meanwhile, the development of models
that consider many network parameters and variables are complicated. For an
example, the reliability of route in MANET is often impossible to be simplified
and to be modeled due its NP-complete problems (Ghalavand et al., 2010).
Therefore, simplifying parameters such in analytical approaches are unreliable
methods for describing the network performance. In this situation, DES can
be used to demonstrate the network performance. However, it needs extensive
analysis on the data of experiments.
Most of MANET performance analyses based on simulation do not provide
extensive analysis on the experimental results. Gnana Durai and Parthasarathy
(2005); Ramaswami and Upadhyaya (2006); Razak et al. (2008); Komninos and
Douligeris (2009), and Lu et al. (2009) perform simple analysis based on raw
data from simulators in their reports. They present the results of performance in
simple graphs based on the data, and disregards mathematical models. As such,
their works are insufficient to predict the future outcomes without rerunning the
simulation in the new configuration. In addition, the results are also incapable in
describing which potential source has contributed to the results.
1.4 Research Questions
As indicated in Section 1.2, this research proposes a new framework for
securing MANET from the attacks, and provides extensive analyses of the security
framework performance. Thus, it is a challenge to develop the security framework
and to provide MANET performance analysis based on the experimental data.
The following is the list of research questions for achieving the goals of this
research.
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a. On measuring the vulnerability of existing MANET routing protocol to
existing and future types of attacks, the following research questions are
answered:
(i) How to objectively measure the vulnerability of MANET routing
protocol?
(ii) What are the possible future attacks for MANET and how to
measure the severity of the attacks?
(iii) How to represent the attacks in the simulation test-bed?
b. On designing, improving and analyzing a new lightweight layered security
framework to counter simple attack that is represented by blackhole attack,
the following research questions are answered:
(i) What are the components of the new security framework that counter
the above attack?
(ii) How to maintain integrity, prevent from deceiving activities and
provide immune from factorization attack?
(iii) How to design a light weight framework that require smaller packet
size and less computation resources?
c. On designing, improving and analyzing the enhancement of the security
framework to counter sophisticated attack that is represented by wormhole
attack, the following research questions are answered:
(i) What are the components of the enhancement of the security
framework that counter wormhole attack?
(ii) How to design the detection algorithms for detecting the attack in
near realtime?
(iii) How to design the countermeasures that can react efficiently on the
attacks detected?
(iv) How to design an efficient spreading red messages to warn the
network under attack?
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d. On proposing and analyzing the performance of the security framework
based on regression and neural network data analysis, the following research
questions are answered:
(i) How to design the models of the security framework performance
based on experimental data?
(ii) Why the model considers more than one techniques to profile the
security framework performance?
From those points above, the following is the main research question to
be answered: “How to develop a robust security mechanism to protect
AODV routing protocol?”
1.5 Research Objectives
There are four research objectives of this research:
(a) To objectively measure the vulnerability of existing MANET
routing protocol to existing and future types of attacks.
(b) To design, improve and analyze a new lightweight layered security
framework to counter simple attack that is represented by blackhole
attack.
(c) To design, improve and analyze the enhancement of the security
framework to counter sophisticated attack that is represented by
wormhole attack.
(d) To propose and analyze the performance of the security framework
based on regression and neural network data analysis.
1.6 Scopes
Some scopes are applied to this research work in order to keep the
observation tractable. They are:
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(a) This research enhances AODV routing protocol security as it is the most
widely used protocol for MANET.
(b) This research focuses on the security of network layer, and assume that
all benign nodes consider all security protections when the network under
attacks (blackhole and wormhole attacks)
(c) This research considers using ideal data link communication of MANET.
(d) All nodes participants implements conventional IPv4 addressing model.
(e) For analysis based on regression, this research assumes that each of the
performance metrics (response) is independent of each others; it means
that there is no relationship between the performance metrics.
1.7 Research Contributions
This work has primary research contributions and secondary research
contributions. The following is the primary research contributions.
(a) A new MANET security metrics for the measurement of the severity of
attacks.
(b) A new efficient secure protocol that is immune from factorization attack.
(c) Novel algorithms of IDS to detect both simple and sophisticated attacks.
(d) The network performance models based on regression and neural network
data analysis for profiling the security of MANET routing protocols.
The secure protocol and IDS with countermeasures complements each
other for preventing MANET from the attacks. They are bounded within
new security framework for securing the network. In addition, the proposed
securities do not add the complexity of the network. Thus, the secondary research
contribution is as below:
(a) New variants of blackhole and wormhole attacks to represent possible
future class of attacks.
(b) Corrected SAODV architecture.
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(c) Enhanced Java in Time Simulator/Scalable Wireless Adhoc Network
Simulator (JiST/SWANS) (http://jist.ece.cornell.edu/, 2010) as a
MANET security simulator.
1.8 Outline of Thesis
This work studied three important topics in MANET: secure routing
protocol, intrusion detection with countermeasure and performance metrics
models. The chapter of this thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 1, Introduction. Chapter 1 discusses overview, motivations,
background of problems, research question, and contributions of this research.
Chapter 2, Literature Review. Chapter 2 discusses and reviews the
current research works in securing MANET routing.
Chapter 3, Research Methodology. Chapter 3 discusses the research
methodology adopted in designing security and in modeling performance of the
MANET routing protocol.
Chapter 4, Enhanced Security for MANET Routing Protocol.
Chapter 4 implements the research framework in order to design and develop
enhanced security for AODV routing protocol.
Chapter 5, Modeling Data of Performance. Chapter 5 analyzes the
data of ESAODV to develop the performance of the layered security of MANET
routing.
Chapter 6, Summary and Future Works. Chapter 6 summarizes and
discusses some specific topics for future works.
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